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UID:pretalx-ozsec-2026-CXD7BW@cfp.ozsecurity.org
DTSTART;TZID=CST:20261023T100000
DTEND;TZID=CST:20261023T104500
DESCRIPTION:Rubber Ducky's are pretty well known so you might hope a user w
 on't just plug in a random parking lot flash drive\, but do you think they
  might plug in a random keyboard that looks exactly like the keyboard they
  already have?  Especially if they are told it is a magical keyboard that 
 will make their computer much faster? \n\nThis talk is all about designing
  and building a malicious keyboard and then what you can do with it and ho
 w you might go about defending from something like this.
DTSTAMP:20261011T004723Z
LOCATION:Redbud A
SUMMARY:Sneaking Malicious Hardware into a Keyboard - neko
URL:https://cfp.ozsecurity.org/ozsec-2026/talk/CXD7BW/
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UID:pretalx-ozsec-2026-8FFRB3@cfp.ozsecurity.org
DTSTART;TZID=CST:20261023T143000
DTEND;TZID=CST:20261023T151500
DESCRIPTION:Firmware extraction is a critical first step in hardware securi
 ty assessments\, and eMMC storage is one of the most commonly encountered 
 targets across "higher-end" embedded AI and IoT devices. This talk covers 
 two practical approaches to extracting firmware from eMMC chips: in-circui
 t lead tapping and full chip-off removal. We walk through identifying eMMC
  pinouts\, soldering to exposed test points\, and interfacing with afforda
 ble readers for in-circuit extraction\, then cover hot air desoldering\, B
 GA reballing\, and reading bare chips via socket adapters for chip-off. Fo
 r each method\, we discuss tooling\, trade-offs\, failure modes\, and when
  to choose one approach over the other based on board layout\, risk tolera
 nce\, and common obstacles like epoxy potting and locked partitions.
DTSTAMP:20261011T004723Z
LOCATION:Redbud C
SUMMARY:eMMC Firmware Extraction - neko
URL:https://cfp.ozsecurity.org/ozsec-2026/talk/8FFRB3/
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